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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ARNOLD MACHINERY COMPANY, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
No. 16934 
DAVID M. BALLS and RICHARD 
S. JOHNS II, co-partners, 
dba UTAH EXCAVATING, 
Defendant - Respondents . 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action wherein plaintiff seeks to recover 
unpaid rentals, pursuant to an equipment rental agreemen~ in 
the amount of $13,889.64, together with interest and attor-
ney's fees and to recover the sum of $127.35 for repair work. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The court, sitting without a jury, ruled that the 
equipment lease was as a matter of law a security instrument 
and that the Uniform Commercial Code transformed the lease 
into a conditional sales contract and that since there was no 
compliance with the terms of the Uniform Commercial Code re-
lating to conditional sales contracts, plaintiff could not 
recover unpaid rentals. The court only allowed recovery of 
$127.35 for repair costs on the second claim. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment relating 
to rentals and a remand of the action to the District Court 
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with the direction to enter judgment in the amount of $13,889.64 
together with interest, and together with such reasonable attor-
ney's fees as the lower court shall determine. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff-appellant Arnold Machinery Company (Arnold) 
is and was in the business of both selling and leasing equip-
ment (T. 108). Defendant-respondent Utah Excavating, a part-
nership, was in the excavating business. It had a job on which 
a backhoe was needed. Arnold had one in inventory and repre-
sentatives of Arnold and Utah Excavating discussed the alterna-
tives of purchasing or renting one (T. 110). A lease agreement 
instead of a purchase agreement is often entered into if the 
contractor is not sure how long his work will last (T. 123), 
even though financially able to purchase. For those in the posi· 
tion of Utah Excavating, of not being financially able to pur-
chase, entering into a lease is a common transaction (T. 134-
135). 
If the backhoe were to be purchased, a twenty-percent 
down payment, or approximately $20,000 would have been required 
(T. 111). Utah Excavating did not have the funds for a down 
payment, nor were they sure if their work would last long 
enough to warrant purchasing the equipment. The evidence was; 
Q, Did you express to their salesman 
what your objective was in coming 
to them? 
-2-
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A. Yes 
Q. What was that? 
A. That we were interested in obtain-
ing a backhoe so that we could use 
it to perform work that we had more 
or less had committed to us if we 
had that type of equipment. 
(Johns of Utah Excavating T. 169) 
A. We wanted a piece of equipment simi-
lar to this because we had work to 
do with it. And because of our fin-
ancial condition, not having suffic-
ient money to make a down payment 
and being aware that these kinds of 
alternatives to purchase were avail-
able, we elected to use that kind of 
an arrangement rather than have to 
come up with that much capital at 
that time in order to get the equip-
ment to put it to use. 
(Johns of Utah. :C: xcavating T. 195) 
In lieu of buying the backhoe, it was decided that it would 
be rented for a long enough period to determine whether or 
not the work would last and to permit them to acquire from 
the work sufficient funds to make a down payment. If the 
work lasted and if they acquired funds for a down payment, 
it was then the intent of the parties that a conditional 
sales contract would be substituted for a rental agreement. 
* * *They then, of course, decided they 
did not have the money for a down pay-
ment, nor were they sure if the type of 
work they had was going to last for this 
two or three-year period. So in lieu of 
buying the piece of equipment we then 
elected to rent it to them until they 
found out if the work was going to hold 
out, and also they could use the rental 
payments by which to acquire a down pay-
ment and then put it on to a conditional 
sales contract. 
(Byerline of Arnold T. 110, 111) 
-3-
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A. The other option is the so-called 
lease where we would make an es-
tablished payment for a given per-
iod of time, hopefully with the end 
result being that we would then ac-
quire sufficient equity in that 
machine to allow us to obtain financ-
ing.** * 
A. We could convert to a purchase. We 
could actually purchase that machine. 
We would have acquired a down payment 
through the money that we had paid 
over the period of six months, so 
that we would then be able to ac-
tually purchase that machine.*** 
A. Not that I recall. He indicated 
that there would be a six-month 
minimum. We would have to pay the 
six-month payments, and if we de-
sired to continue longer we could, 
but it was to our advantage to con-
vert to a purchase as quickly as we 
possibly could because of the fin-
ance charges, and we were also mak-
ing payments that were really quite 
high, * * * 
(Johns of Utah Excavating T. 171) 
***But we knew we didn't have the 20 
percent, or ten percent required down 
payment, so we could see that this was 
a viable way for us to obtain the equip-
ment we wanted, to get it right to work, 
and have it earn for us the money we 
needed to make the down payment so that 
we could eventually finance it. 
(Johns of Utah Excavating T. 172) 
Thus, a rental agreement was entered into (Ex. 1-P, T. 112) 
instead of a conditional sales contract. The rental agree-
ment was accompanied by an option to purchase which provided 
that rental payments could be applied against the purchase 
price. (Ex. 2-P) Arnold's experience in rentals such as this 
was that only twenty to twenty-five percent of those renting 
-4-
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equipment exercised their option to purchase (T. 114). The 
parties treated the transaction as a lease. Arnold paid its 
supplier-manufacturer Drott only upon a subsequent sale of 
the backhoe to Salt Lake County, whereas it would have had to 
pay Dr~tt upon execution of the rental agreement, had the 
rental been a sale. (T. 161). Arnold took the depreciation 
of the backhoe on its corporate books for the rental period. 
(T. 114). Arnold made major repairs at its expense during 
the rental period and, in fact, acquired and paid for parts 
needed for such repairs (T. 299). Utah Excavatins, instead 
of depreciating the backhoe as if it owned it, expensed 
rental payments (T. 211). 
The parties contemplated that a six-month period 
was a long enough one for Utah Excavating both to determine 
whether or not their work warranted the purchase of the equip-
ment and to pay rentals in a sufficient amount to enable Utah 
Excavating to terminate the lease and enter into a conditional 
sales contract applying the rental payments as a down payment 
on the conditional sales contract. Utah Excavating's testi-
mony relating thereto is as follows: 
A. As we discussed this option with 
Arnold Machinery, the kind of lang-
uage that was used was to the effect 
that we would go on accruing our 
down payment as we were making these 
payments towards this so-called lease, 
so that we would be able to then at 
the end of the six months have suf-
ficient money to make the down payment. 
* * * 
-5-
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Q. And the lease would have been term-
inated and the conditional sales con-
tract would have then been entered 
into, right? 
A. That is correct. 
(Johns of Utah Excavating T. 20S) 
Q. The option not to buy presently, but 
to buy six months later, right? 
A. The option to have this piece of 
Equipment to use and to accrue money 
during the time we were using it 
so that we would be able to event-
ually make this other arrangement, 
this purchase. 
(Johns of Utah Excavating T. 209) 
Q. That may be. Did you feel that you 
were bound to ·k '"/( '"/( do anything more 
than pay the six-month rental? * * * 
A. That is correct. 
(Johns of Utah Excavating T. 210) 
A. ***But we knew we didn't have the 
20 percent, or ten percent required 
down payment, so we could see that 
this was a viable way for us to ob-
tain the equipment we wanted, to get 
it right to work, and have it earn 
for us the money we needed to make 
the down payment so that we could 
eventually finance it. 
(Balls of Utah Excavating T. 172) 
Q. You didn't have an intention at the 
time you entered into the rental 
agreement, and the option agreement, 
to continue with that type of agree-
-6-
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ment for an indefinite period of 
time, did you? 
A. No. We wanted to purchase the mach-
ine as quickly as possible. * * * 
A. But we were going to do it for the 
six months and then we were going 
to pay Arnold Machinery the balance. 
(Balls of Utah Excavating T. 268, 269) 
Utah Excavating's excavation work did not develop 
as it had anticipated, and it became delinquent in rental pay-
ments (T. 204). Arnold requested payment, and its salesman 
testified as to collection efforts: 
A. Basically just requests for payment, 
and of course they would keep prom-
ising us they would have money com-
ing in off of their jobs, and we went 
along and worked with them as best we 
possibly could and left the machine 
out so they could still work it. But 
this went on several times. 
(Welch of Arnold T. 317) 
When the collection efforts failed, Mr. Johns of Utah Exca-
vating concluded that Utah Excavating was unable to finance 
the purchase of the backhoe, and so Utah Excavating did not 
attempt to purchase the machine. He testified: 
Q. 
A. 
* * * When did you wish to exercise 
the option, at the end of the six 
months? 
We had intended to do that. However 
at the end of the six months we had 
not made six payments. We didn't 
feel like we could obtain the finan-
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cing at that time with the little 
amount that we had accrued, so we 
didn't even attempt to finance the 
machine at the end of six months. 
(T. 212) 
Utah Excavating concluded it would have to "forget it." 
The Arnold representative testified: 
Q. All right. State what was said con-
cerning termination, Arnold terminating? 
A. Basically it was that we couldn't 
release the machine back to them 
unless the back payments were caught 
up. That was the basis of all of 
the conversations. And we would 
work with them the best we possibly 
could if he would catch his payments 
up. 
(Welch of Arnold T. 320) 
A. The last conversation that I finally 
had with Mr. Balls, I told him it 
was subject to future rental and that 
we did have people looking to rent 
this machine. And he finally told 
me that he did not have the money. 
In his words, lI guess I will have 
to forget it. '· 
(Welch of Arnold T. 318) 
The parties all intended that the conversion of the 
lease to a sale would occur six months after the lease was 
executed (T. 171, 172, 196, 208, 209, 210). 
The parties discussed what would happen if the lease 
went beyond six months by one or two months. It was decided 
that it could go on a little longer. Mr. Johns testified: 
A. No. This was, it was a six-month 
agreement, but the way the discus-
sion went at that time if we didn't 
feel at the end of six months that 
we had enough money accrued into 
the thing, or we wanted to pay a 
few more months and keep the mach-
-8-
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ine before we converted to the 
purchase situation, we could have 
gone on a little longer. 
(T. 237) 
A. We intended to buy the machine at 
the end of six months, right. 
Q. At the end of six months. Now as I 
recall you said probably Mr. Byerline 
indicated that if it went over the 
six months by one or two months that 
that would be all right. Was there 
a conversation to that effect? 
A. Yes. * ·k ·k 
(T. 266) 
However, Johns, the partner in Utah Excavating handl-
ing its financial affairs did not contemplate at the time the 
lease was entered into what the machine would be worth after 
the six-month rental period. He was thinking of conversion to 
a conditional sales contract at the end of a 6-month's lease. 
He testified: 
Q. Did you form an expectation as to 
what the equipment, or an anticipa-
tion as to what the equipment, would 
be worth after one year? 
A. No. I don't recall having done that. 
(T. 190) 
Utah Excavating became delinquent. It paid only 
$12, 823. 29 (Ex. D9) of the agreed six months' rentals of $23,400. 
Had the rentals been paid and the option to purchase exercised, 
a conditional sales contract would then have been entered into 
-9-
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and the lease would have been terminated (T. 112). The $23,400 
rental payments would have been shown as a down payment and the 
remaining $72,736.50 would have been the unpaid contract bal-
ance amount (T. 86, 132). (That remaining contract balance 
takes into account the cost of repairs and the option charge of 
1-1/4% per month, both of which under the option agreement were 
to be added to the $92,220 option price, Ex. 2-~) 
After Utah Excavating could go no further and had term-
inated the lease after approximately 8 months (T. 319, 318), 
Arnold rented the backhoe to Salt Lake County. The rental 
agreement was accompanied by an option to purchase for $85,000, 
plus $850 per month option charge. (T. 160). The County paid 
four months rental totaling $15,600 (T. 154) and then determined 
that it wanted to purchase the equipment. Under its option 
agreement it would have had to have paid $85,000 plus an op-
tion charge of $3,400, less rental payments of $15,600 or a 
balance of $72,800 (T. 121-122). Instead of exercising its 
option to purchase, the County advertised for bids for supply-
ing a backhoe, and Arnold submitted a bid for $66,400 (Ex. 6, 
T. 127). The County accepted this bid as being the lowest bid 
for a machine of acceptable quality, and the County paid 
$66,400 for the machine. There thus was no exercise of the 
County's option to purchase, which would have entailed the 
larger sum to purchase the property. 
-10-
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The lease to Utah Excavating provided: 
Arnold Machinery Company .... hereby 
leases to Utah Excavating ... for a 
minimum period of six months and, 
thereafter until the equipment is 
returned or until the lessor term-
inates the lease, the equipment 
hereinafter described, according to 
the terms and provisions hereinafter 
stated .... (Ex. 1-P) 
The Court construed that provision as meaning that 
the lease continued in effect until there was a breach by 
either party of the terms and conditions of the lease. The 
Court said: 
THE COURT: 
So what my immediate interpretation 
of that, yet it is a six-month lease 
but it continued thereafter unless 
either of the parties terminates it 
according to the terms of the lease 
which is stated hereafter in the lease. 
Or on the back of the lease. 
MR. LOWE: 
Is Your Honor construing this lease 
as going on forever insofar as Arnold 
Machinery is concerned, and at the 
whim of the lessee to terminate it 
otherwise? I don't think could be a 
reasonable construction, Your Honor. 
MR. RICHARDS: 
I certainly do, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: 
Just a minute. Just a minute. My im-
mediate construction right now is that 
if the parties remain current in their 
payments that this lease could have gone 
on indefinitely, under the wording of 
this particular lease, unless they vio-
-11-
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lated one of the provisions herein-
after provided for in the lease. And 
if they violate those provisions then 
they have cause or grounds to set it 
aside. I think that was the intent of 
the parties. It appears from the testi-
mony that I have heard in this matter 
thus far. 
MR. LOWE: 
The testimony has always been, Your 
Honor, that neither of these defendants 
thought that it would, expected that it 
would go on for more than six months. 
At that point they intended to convert it 
into a, not a lease but a conditional 
sales contract. And the Court, I think, 
should look at those circumstances in 
construing whether or not this lease was 
intended by the parties to go on for-
ever. 
THE COURT: 
I think you're correct when you state, of 
course, that the testimony is that they 
expect to convert it. But I think under 
the terms of the lease, if that expecta-
tion didn't materialize, they could have 
continued to lease it. 
So based on that the Court would allow, 
would overrule the objection and allow, 
the witness to answer the question. 
(T. 311, 312) 
The Court then felt that it was a waste of Court's 
time to consider the intention of the parties at the time 
the equipment lease agreement was entered into that the 
option should be exercised in six months. The Court said: 
MR. DIBBLEE: 
Well, I mean I didn't, I thought that 
that issue was more or less concluded 
and there wasn't any sense of wasting 
the Court's time. 
THE COURT: 
I think it really is myself * * * 
-12-
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,1. 
The Court thereupon considered not just the cost of 
exercising the option to purchase at the expiration of six 
months when the parties intended that the option should be 
exercised, which was $76,473.46, (T. 90), but over objection 
admitted evidence relating to figures one, two and three years 
later. Mathematical calculations were carried out to the 
point at which rental payments - had the lease continued long 
enough and had rental payments been made - would have exceeded 
the option purchase price of $92,220 (T. 90-92). The court 
considered, also over objection, the value of the machine at the 
date three years later when rentals would have exceeded the 
value of the machine (T. 299-314). 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE LEASE WAS NOT IN PERPETUITY 
The lower court concluded that it deemed the lease to 
be one in which the lessee was bound for only six months and 
then could terminate at any time without cause, but that the 
lessor could only terminate the lease for cause, or that both 
parties could terminate only for cause, and if there were no 
cause that it would have run forever. Such a result appears 
to be a most unreasonable one. The pertinent part of the 
lease is as follows: 
Arnold Machinery Company, Inc., a Utah cor-
poration whose address is 2975 West 21st So., 
Salt Lake City, County of Salt Lake, State of 
Utah, hereinafter called the lessor, hereby 
leases to Utah Excavating whose address is 4591 
Holly Lane, City of Salt Lake, County of Salt 
-13-
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Lake, State of Utah 84117, hereinafter called 
the lessee, for a minimum period of six months 
and thereafter until the equipment is returne~ 
or until lessor terminates the lease, the equip-
ment hereinafter described, according to the 
terms and provisions hereinafter stated. (Ex. 1-P) 
(Emphasis added). 
The lease set forth terms and provisions concerning mainten-
ance, repairs, tire charges, damage to equipment, condition 
of the equipment on delivery, defects in equipment, compli-
ance with lease, damage by the elements, indemnification 
against loss, insurance, title, disclosure of location, sub-
letting, acceleration of rentals in event of default, reposses-
sion, interest, attorney's fees, etc. These provisions logi-
cally apply to the lease during its stated term. The lower 
court illogically construed the phrase "according to the terms and 
provisions hereinafter stated" as modifying the verb "termina.tes. 11 
Such a strained construction would, after deleting extraneous 
words, result in: "Arnold Machinery hereby leases to Utah 
Excavating until the lessor terminates according to the terms 
and provisions herein stated." Such a construction would re-
sult in the default provisions not being applicable during the 
stated term of the lease. A logical construction, which would 
give effect to what any lessor and lessee would have contem-
plated, is that the phrase "according to the terms and provi-
sions hereinafter stated" modifies the vel:b "leas es . " The 
latter construction would, after deleting extraneous language, 
result in: "Arnold Machinery Company hereby leases to Utah 
-14-
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Excavating according to the terms hereinafter stated.'' A 
reasonable construction of the rental agreement is that the 
express right to terminate the lease in the various situa-
tions of default and remedies provided for in such event are 
not in limitation of the lessor's right to terminate after 
the minimum period of time of six months, but rather permit 
the lessor during the minimum period to terminate in the event 
of such defaults. 
If such reasonable construction is given the rental 
agreement, then the Maryland case relied upon by defendants 
United Rental Equipment Company vs. Potts and Callahan 
Contracting Company, 231 Maryland 552, 191 Atlantic 2d 570, 
574 is neither controlling nor persuasive, because in that 
case the Court relied upon the fact that: 
The only option given the lessor to 
terminate the lease is for enumerated 
causes. This is consistent with an ex-
tended period of rental payments to be 
determined solely by the lessee. 
That court reasoned that, if the lessor could not terminate the 
lease prior to the time at which lease payments would exceed 
the option to purchase price, then the provision of 70A-l-201 
(37) would be applicable. That section provides that a trans-
action is not a lease, but a sale with the creation of a secur-
ity interest if the lessee has "the option to become the owner 
of the property for no additional consideration or for a nom-
-15-
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inal consideration" as set forth in subsection (b) : 
An agreement that upon compliance with 
the terms of the lease the lessee shall 
become or has the option to become the 
owner of the property for no additional 
consideration or for a nominal consider-
ation does make the lease one intended 
for security. 
A proper construction of the lease here is that after six 
months the lessor could terminate without cause. Consequently, 
Utah Excavating's lease is not such a lease as there involved. 
The Maryland case is further distinguishable because 
the Maryland court, in determining whether or not the lease 
"is intended as security," as provided by the code, determined 
that the intent of the parties was that it should continue 
until the full option price had been paid. The code provides 
that "whether a lease is intended as security is to be deter-
mined by the facts of each case." In the Maryland case there 
was no expressed intention of the parties that the option was 
to be e~ercised at the end of six months. Here, both Johns 
and Balls of Utah Excavating testified that they intended to 
exercise the option then. (T. 172, 208, 209). Therefore, 
there is no reasonable basis for any ruling that the parties 
intended that the option would be exercised at such later 
time as the rental payments would have equaled the option 
price. Defendants here argued that the court could have con-
sidered times 10 or 20 years later if such longer period were 
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needed to make rentals equal the ,option price (T. 300). 
The lower court's determination should have been what 
the parties intended at the time they entered into the trans-
action. That intent has been stated by the parties
1 
and no 
later ruling of law that the lease could have continued for-
ever and the option could have been exercised whenever rentals 
exceeded option price is any reflection of what the parties in-
tended. 
In the event this Court feels that the Maryland case 
is not distinguishable, then we submit that the Maryland case 
and this case were erroneously decided, because 1-201 (37) of 
the code provides that if "upon compliance with the terms of 
the lease" the lessee may.become the owner of the property by 
paying a nominal consideration, the transaction is one intended 
for security. Here, even adopting the construction advocated 
by Utah Excavating that the lessee may terminate after six 
months but the lessor is bound forever (T. 311), the lessee 
would only be obligated to make six months' payments. After 
six months, it would have had no obligation to pay if it 
wished to terminate. The "compliance with the terms of the 
lease" by the lessee would reasonably relate to a payment of 
the rentals the lessee was obligated to make. At the time of 
entering into the rental agreement that obligation was only 
to pay the minimum six-month rental, since the lessee could 
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then terminate the lease. At that point, the option price 
was $99,136.50. The agreed rental obligation was $23,400.00, 
leaving a balance to exercise the option of $75,736.50, which 
is hardly a nominal payment. 
There is an exhaustive annotation on "Equipment Leases 
as Security Interest Within Uniform Commercial Code § 1-201 
II (37) in 76 ALR 3d 11. The only case cited relating to a hold-
ing over lease situation is the Maryland case, which at the 
most would be persuasive rather than binding upon this Court. 
The other cases in the 99-page annotation relate to a fixed 
option price at the end of a stated term lease. Such was the 
situation in FMA Financial Corporation vs. Pro-Printers, 
U. 2d ~_,590 P. 2d 803. A reasonable construction of sub-
section (b) is that it applies to a situation in which the 
lessee is bound to make payments which equal or exceed the 
purchase price, in which event the statute makes the trans-
action a security interest and subject to the Commercial Code 
requirements relating to secured transactions. The UCC crea-
tion of an artificial situation in which a lease is deemed a 
sale should not be extended to cover a situation in which 
the lessee is not obligated to pay a sum substantially equal 
to the purchase price. 
II. THE PARTIES INTENDED THAT THERE NOT BE 
A SECURITY INTEREST 
Section 70A-201 (37) provides: 
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Whether a lease is intended as security 
is to be determined by the facts of each 
case; however (a) the inclusion of an op-
tion to purchase does not of itself make 
the lease one intended for security. 
Here the parties considered whether to have a lease or 
whether to utilize a conditional sales contract which would 
create a security interest. The parties consciously chose to 
enter into a lease instead of a conditional sales contract 
and later, if available jobs and financial ability developed 
as anticipated at the end of six months, to terminate the 
lease and then enter into a conditional sales agreement and 
then to create a security interest, and if not the lease could 
be terminated. They therefore did not intend that the trans-
action was a conditional sale with a security interest re-
served. 
Utah Excavating and the lower court relied upon FMA 
Financial Corporation vs. Pro-Printers et al~- U2d ~-' 590 
Pacific 2d, 803. That case is distinguishable upon its facts. 
In that case there was a firm 60-month lease with an option 
price at the end of the 60 months, which was 10% of the cost 
of the equipment and 6% of the total lease payments. This case 
is in no way comparable insofar as the relation of the option 
price to cost and lease payments is concerned, and, even under 
the facts in the FMA case, there was a 3 - 2 decision. 
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Various factors influencing the determination as to 
whether or not the lease was intended by the parties to be 
a conditional sale with a security interest reserved are set 
forth in the annotation in 76 ALR 3d: 
Option to Purchase 
This alone under the code does not indicate a security 
interest. 
Option to Purchase For No Additional Consideration 
This factor is determined as of the date the option 
was to be exercised. Here that date was six months 
later when the purchase price was substantial, not 
3 years later. Thus no security interest was intended. 
Relationship Between Option Price and Value at the Time 
Option Was to be Exercised 
Here the parties did not consider any value other 
than the value anticipated six months after execution 
of the lease, when it was contemplated the option 
would be exercised, at which point the option price 
was not dispropqrtionate to the value. Thus no sec-
urity interest was intended. 
Absence of Alternative to Exercise of Ootion 
At the end of the contemplated six-month period 
there was a viable economic alternative open to 
Utah Excavating, particularly if it did not have jobs 
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available, to terminate the lease and not exercise 
the option to purchase, indicating no security inter-
est. 
Nature of Lessor's Business 
Arnold was in the business of both selling and leas-
ing equipment and not in the business of financing 
same as was FMA Financial Corporation, indicating no 
security interest. 
Lessor's Security Anxiety 
Whether or not a security deposit was required for 
performance has been considered by some courts as a 
factor. Here there was no security deposit which 
would be indicative of no security interest. 
Default or Termination Provisions 
The existence of various rights given to the lessor 
upon default by lessee, as expressly set forth in this 
lease, is indicative that there is no security inter-
est. 
Tax Consequences 
The parties here treated the transaction as a true 
lease and not as a security interest in their tax 
treatment of the transaction, indicating no security 
interest. 
The above factors reinforce the conclusion that should 
have been reached from the expressed intention of the parties 
that a lease and not a security transaction was intended. 
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CONCLUSION 
The lease by its terms was not in perpetuity, nor was 
it intended to be so. Therefore, 70A-l-201 (37) (b) is inap-
plicable, which provides that a lease is one intended for 
security if upon compliance with its terms the lessee has the 
option to become the owner for no additional consideration. 
70A-l-201 (37) (a), which provides that the inclusion 
of an option to purchase does not of itself make the lease 
one intended as security, is applicable. The clause in 70A-
1-201 (37) that is controlling is "whether a lease is intended 
as security is to be determined by the facts of each case." 
Here the expressed intention of the parties that they in-
tended a lease instead of a purchase and that the option was 
to be exercised six months after the rental agreement was 
entered into should have been accepted by the lower court in 
determining "whether a lease is intended as security.u That 
intention was that there should be a lease and not a condi-
tional sale creating a security interest, and that the option 
was to be exercised at a time when a very substantial rather 
than nominal consideration would have had to have been paid 
in order to exercise the option to purchase. 
Respectfully submitted, 
{'/ 
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John W. Lowe 
Lowe & Associates 
Attorney for Appellant 
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